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Recent defense industry consolidation has created
several large defense firms. As a result of merger activity
with their suppliers and competitors, these firms account for
an increasing percentage of sales to the Department of
Defense. This thesis investigated seven large defense
industry mergers, involving 12 defense firms, to assess the
effect of the mergers on the firms. Changes in a firms'
anticipated abnormal earnings both premerger and post-merger
were analyzed to determine whether the defense firms exhibit
monopoly power.
The merger process was divided into five stages. The
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) valuation model was used to create
measures of firms' expected abnormal earnings at each stage.
Each firm's resulting abnormal rates of return on equity were
observed and analyzed between stages to track changes in
assessments of expected abnormal earnings as the merger
process proceeded.
Major findings indicate that post-merger abnormal rates
of return increased from premerger levels for all firms.
These findings are consistent with defense firm earnings
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The Department of Defense (DOD) procurement budget has
decreased nearly 65% in real terms since its 1985 high.
This sharp decline in spending has caused an increase in
defense industry mergers and restructuring by individual
firms. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Vertical
Integration identified 34 defense mergers and acquisitions
that were consummated from 1994 through March 1997 (DSB,
1997) . The consolidation of the defense industrial base
raises issues for DOD concerning competitiveness, vertical
integration, and maintaining industrial capabilities needed
to meet current and future national security requirements.
DOD relies on market forces to the maximum extent
possible to guide the development and sustainment of
industrial capabilities. Recent defense industry
consolidation has created several large defense firms. These
large defense firms account for an increasing percentage of
sales to DOD as a result of merger activity with their
suppliers and competitors. The wave of mergers between the
largest defense firms in 1996 and 1997 raises concerns for a
monopoly emerging.
Even though the Federal Trade Commission has approved
all merger proposals for these firms, the possibility for
monopoly power (higher prices for goods and services for
DOD) to exist after the merger is omnipresent . Firms exhibit
monopoly power by their ability to earn higher than normal
return on their invested capital, termed abnormal earnings.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this research is to investigate and
analyze anticipated abnormal earnings of defense firms in
the wake of the furious merger activity within the industry.
The research starts with the premise that a firm's future
earning power is reflected in the current value of its
stock, since investor expectation of future earnings are
discounted into the stock price. The research employs the
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) accounting valuation model to
identify abnormal earnings of defense firms pre and post-
merger. The EBO model provides a method, using accounting
data, stock prices and cost of capital to measure expected
abnormal earnings. Analyzing differences in abnormal
earnings of pre and post- merger firms leads to conclusions
about monopoly power.
There have been numerous studies of industry
concentration effects on competition. This research is the
first of its kind that attempts to quantify the anticipated
gains in profitability of dominant firms in the defense
industry as a result of recent mergers. Ultimately, the
research examines whether merger activity in the defense
industry has created monopoly power in selected defense
firms. The research attempts to answer the following primary
and secondary questions:
1. Primary Research Question
Has merger activity in the defense industry increased
monopoly power of individual defense firms?
2. Secondary Research Questions
1. What is the relationship between monopoly position,
earnings power, and the ability to generate abnormal
earnings?
2 . What is the EBO model and how can the EBO model be
used to quantify a firm's ability to earn abnormal returns?
a) What is a firm's level of abnormal earnings
before a major acquisition or merger?
b) What happens to a firm's level of abnormal
earnings after announcing a merger to the market?
c) What is the merged firm's level of abnormal
earnings?
3. How does a firm's abnormal earnings change as a
result of a merger?
C . METHODOLOGY
Research was conducted in three distinct phases:
literature review, data collection and spreadsheet building,
and data analysis. Each phase is summarized below.
1. Literature Review
A thorough investigation of the literature relating to
defense merger activity was conducted using the Lexus/Nexus
data base, Internet, periodicals, Government Accounting
Office (GAO) reports, and DOD publications. In addition,
academic literature relating to merger and monopoly theory
and the EBO model provided the framework for the analysis. A
major portion of this research involved transforming the
original EBO model. The literature review resulted in
material found in Chapters II and III.
2 . Data Collection
This phase included the tasks of identifying data
sources, selecting a sample population of defense firms,
collecting data for EBO model input, and calculating
abnormal earnings for each firm through several stages of
their merger process.
Twelve large defense firms involved in seven mergers
since 1994 were selected from the aerospace and defense
industry group for use in the study. Firms were among the
top 20 U.S. defense firms in the year analyzed and derived
at least 25 percent of their revenue from the defense
department
.
Data collection efforts focused on firm accounting data
as well as market data required for use in the EBO model.
Annual and quarterly financial statements for existing
defense firms provided accounting data. Other investment
reference publications contributed data for firms no longer
in existence. Non-accounting data, including risk premiums
and stock prices, was collected from various electronic and
hard copy sources
.
The merger process was divided into five distinct
stages so that discrete measures of abnormal earnings could
be analyzed. The stages are: Pre-Merger Period, Announcement
Date, Interim Period, Post-Merger period 1, and Post-Merger
period 2. The data was normalized for all firms over these
stages to calculate abnormal earnings assessed at each
stage. Chapter IV introduces the merger timeline used for
structuring the analysis.
3 . Data Analysis
Calculations using the EBO model resulted in measures
of the rate of expected future Abnormal Return on Equity
(AROE) assessed at the various stages in the merger process.
Observations of AROE for each firm were compared between
stages. The changes in a firm's AROE was analyzed to assess
the effects mergers had on a firm's ability to generate
abnormal earnings
.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research evaluates abnormal earnings of selected
defense firms, both pre and post-merger, to assess the
presence of monopoly power in those firms. Specifically, the
research attempts to isolate abnormal earnings in defense
firms during and after the merger process using a
transformed version of the EBO model. The model employs
stock price, cost of equity capital, book value and dividend
payout ratio to render an anticipated abnormal rate of
return on equity. This study is a firm by firm analysis
and is not concerned with the overall trends of monopoly
verses competition in the economy. Furthermore, no attempt
is made to measure or assess the current health of the
defense industry due to merger activity. The research
focuses instead on identifying the implications of mergers
involving defense firms for the firms ability to exercise
monopoly power and generate abnormal earnings
.
Assumptions relating to the EBO model are explained in
detail in Chapter III.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II discusses defense merger background and the
literature related to merger and monopoly theory. The
background section discusses history and events in defense
mergers and lays the foundation for why DOD is concerned
with defense mergers.
Chapter III introduces and develops a form of the EBO
model for use in the research to measure abnormal earnings.
Chapter IV is a discussion of the research methodology
including, sample selection, structure of the analysis, data
collection techniques, and use of variables employed in the
EBO model
.
Chapter V describes the firms and mergers in the sample
and presents the resulting measures of abnormal rates of
return from the transformed EBO model. Data is analyzed to
assess the impact of merger activity on abnormal earnings.
Chapter VI summarizes conclusions from the research and
provides recommendations for further study.

II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter highlights the reasons and logic for
exploring the subject of monopoly power in defense firms.
It is broken into two sections; Background and Literature
review. The background section discusses the history and
events in the defense merger game, and DOD's concern with
mergers in general. The latter section investigates the
literature relating to merger and monopoly theory. Defense
industry specific merger issues are also discussed.
B . BACKGROUND
1. History and Events
In the 1990' s, the primary reason for defense industry
merger activity is DOD's decreasing demand for goods and
services reflected in a shrinking procurement budget.
Merger activity began increasing in the mid 1980 ' s as the
authorized defense procurement budget peaked. In today's
declining budget environment, some firms seek to exit the
business while others seize the opportunity to increase
their market share. It is interesting to note that while
defense procurement authorization peaked in 1985 at $96
billion (1996 dollars) , actual outlays did not peak until
1991 at $82 billion
illustrates this trend.
iModzelewski, 1996) . Figure 1




Figure 1 . Procurement Authority vs . Outlays
Since 1991, procurement outlays have been in decline.
The downturn in spending is forecast to bottom out in fiscal
year 2000 at $41 billion. Proposed increases in procurement
spending authority in future budgets will not show up for
another three to five years. Defense firms are simply
positioning themselves for the worst.
In economic terms, defense firms are seeking to lower
their long run average costs by cutting overhead, reducing
capacity and taking advantage of efficiencies offered by
technology. Firms that derive most of their sales from
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defense goods and services are focusing on those core
competencies, while firms with declining market share are
shedding defense business units. The Defense Science Board
Task Force on Vertical Integration and Supplier Decisions
(1997) summed it up best in this statement:
Defense firms are seeking to increase revenue by buying other firms'
existing or "backlog" orders, to improve profit margins and stock market
performance, and to reduce excess capacity. They are also diversifying
their product lines to increase opportunities for future sales. They may act
to "buy now" if attractive or important businesses become available, in
part to deny them to competitors. Finally, many defense firms are buying
electronics and software integration capabilities. While electronics and
software capabilities may be particularly judged as vertical additions, firms
may see these as a key to future system integrator capabilities, or simply as
the potential growth market in defense, (p. 9)
Several defense firms have been on a buying spree in
the last three years. For example, Litton Industries
purchased six niche electronics companies since 1994 to
increase its competitive position. Table 1 lists significant
merger activity from March 1994 to July 1997.
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Table 1. Notable Defense Mergers March 1994- July 1997
Acquiror Acquiree Value Date
Loral IBM Federal Systems $1.575B 3/1/94
Northrop Grumman $2.100B 4/4/94
Martin Marietta General Dynamics Space Systems $209M 5/2/94
Westinghouse Elec Sys Norden Systems <$100M 6/1/94
Northrop Grumman Vought $130M 7/31/94
Allied Signal Textron Lycoming ~$375M 10/28/94
Litton Teledyne Electronic Systems not avail. 12/30/94
Hughes CAELink $170M 2/27/95
Alliant Techsystems Hercules Aerospace $466M 3/15/95
Lockheed* Martin Marietta >$9B 3/15/95
Rolls Royce Allison Gas Turbine $525M 3/30/95
Tracor Lundy Tech Center $7M 3/31/95
Loral Unisys Defense Operations $862M 5/5/95
Litton Imo not avail. 6/5/95
E-Systems* Raytheon $2.3B 6/15/95
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works S300M 9/17/95
GM Hughes Magnavox Electronic Systems $370M 12/14/95
Litton Hughes-Delco Inertial Systems ~$70M 12/31/95
Allied Signal Northrop Grumman Precision ~$50M 12/31/95
Logicon Geodynamics $32M 1/19/96
Litton Sperry Marine $160M 2/9/96
GM Hughes Litton-Itek $26M 2/16/96
Litton PRC $425M 2/20/96
Northrop Grumman Westinghouse Electronic Systems $3.6B 3/2/96
General Dynamics Teledyne Vehicle Systems $55M 3/29/96
Lockheed Martin Loral $9.5B 4/22/96
Raytheon Chrysler Technologies $455M 6/14/96
Southwest Marine Continental Maritime not avail. 6/14/96
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine $110M 7/10/96
Tracor Cordant S65-80M 9/26/96
Boeing Rockwell Aerospace & Defense $3.025B 12/6/96
Litton SAIT Division of SAIC not avail. 12/31/96




GM Hughes Alliant Techsystems Marine
Systems Group
$141M 2/28/97
Boeing* McDonnell Douglas $13. 3B 8/4/97
Announced/Under Review






Lookheed Martin Northrop Grumman $11.6B NA
*For mergers, acquiring and acquired companies are shown in
alphabetical order.
After: Defense Science Board Task Force on Vertical Integration
and Supplier Decisions (1997)
As merger activity increases, larger and larger firms
are being created. In 1995, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
were in talks to merge (Sterngold, 1995) . At the time, both
parties thought the FTC would not tolerate the deal and
discussions broke off. Since then, Raytheon has announced
plans to merge with Hughes' Defense Business ($9.5 billion)
and has acquired Texas Instruments Defense Systems and
Electronics group ($2.95 billion) (Orwall, Lipin, & Wilke,
1997) . Lockheed gobbled up Martin Marietta and Loral
Corporation increasing its revenue base to $25 billion in
1996. In December 1996, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
announced plans to merge. The Federal Trade Commission and
European Union gave final approval for the merger in July
1997 which will create a $48 billion revenue firm with
223,000 employees ("Boeing Completes," 1997). On July 3,
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1997, Lockheed announced plans to buy Northrop Grumman
Corporation for $11.6 billion. These events have
consolidated the industry down to three powerhouse aerospace
defense firms. One industry analyst commented, "We're
getting to the time in the cycle where there are very few
contractors, especially at the prime contractor level... they
have a significant amount of control over the process" (Liu,
1997) . Appendix I shows a comprehensive timeline of defense
firm merger history since 1980. As a result of these events,
DOD has taken an active interest in defense industry
consolidation
.
2 . DOD Role in Mergers
When defense firms propose a merger, several processes
begin. The firm must submit a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing with
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) . These agencies
have 3 days to review the filing and determine if they wish
to investigate further. The agency expressing interest will
conduct the formal review or if both have interest one or
the other will take the lead. The lead agency will then
consult with DOD.
The DOD conducts its review from a customer perspective
focusing on understanding how the proposed transaction might
affect cost, competition, innovation and industrial
capabilities in current and future programs. This review is
14
led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Technology USD (A&T) in accordance with DOD Directive
5000.62.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial
Affairs & Installations develops recommendations, proposals,
and analysis that provide the economic and business rational
for the final DOD decisions and policies en mergers and
acquisitions in the defense industry. The military
departments and defense agencies also review the proposals
to identify areas where the firms are currently competing,
may compete in the future and areas that pose vertical
integration issues (DSB, 1997)
.
It is important to understand that DOD does not have
the final say in the decision to allow or disallow a merger.
The FTC or DOJ have authority to approve mergers, but DOD '
s
feedback often results in clauses in the consent agreement
.
DOD ' s policy on mergers has been to review their impact on
the industrial base while the FTC and DOJ evaluate them from
an antitrust standpoint.
Consolidation and restructuring as cost cutting
measures may cause some firms to lose the capability to
produce certain products for DOD. When defense firms report
that they may no longer provide a product or service, or are
leaving that line of business completely, DOD must assess
the impacts of such a course of action. DOD may maintain a
15
certain level of production for the firm to stay in business
and ensure a source of the product in the future whether it
meets DOD ' s short term requirements or not. In these
instances, an objective analysis for the needed capability
is conducted with guidance from DOD Directive 5000.60,
Defense Industrial Capabilities Assessments (OUSD, A&T,
1996) .
DOD only considers preserving a capability that is
needed to support national security. Any program manager or
service may initiate an Industrial Capabilities Analysis if
the product or service they buy will become unavailable or
is at risk of becoming unavailable during the life cycle of
the program. The latter situation most likely occurs when
firms merge and restructure.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
Two subsets of literature are relevant to this
research. The first explains why firms merge and the
difficulty in assessing their effects on markets. It also
discusses three issues facing defense industry firms today.
The second subset deals with the economists' perspective on
monopoly and defines abnormal earnings.
1 . Merger Theory
Mergers combine two or more firms into one. The
underlying motive for merger activity is to gain profits
(Ravenscraft, Scherer, 1987) . William G Shepherd (1997)
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breaks down three main reasons for mergers, "market power,
technical economies, and pecuniary economies" (p. 151) .
Economies of scale and vertical economies are forms of
technical economies that can be achieved through merger
activity. However, compared to internal growth and long
term contracts, "...the net technical gain from mergers is
usually small, zero, or even negative" (Shepherd, 1997,
p. 16) . Mergers yield pecuniary economies (money benefits
without improving the use of resources) through lower input
prices, tax and/or accounting rules, and promotional
advantages. Firms seek market power to achieve higher
profitability. Market power in defense firms is usually




Horizontal mergers raise market power by
eliminating competition between two firms. The Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas merger exemplifies the horizontal merger
since both companies produce large commercial passenger
aircraft . The economic detriment to customers from
horizontal mergers depends on the market share of the firms
and the concentration ratio of the industry. The structure
of the defense industry has historically been very
concentrated (Ciccotello, 1997) . Research done by Joe Bain
and George Stigler in the 1950' s suggested that industries
17
with high four-firm concentrations were anti-competitive.
However, economists Yale Brozen and Harold Demsetz
identified situations where increased profits were due to
"superior efficiency" rather than anti-competitive conduct.
(McChesney, 1993)
Antitrust agencies use the Herf indahl-Hirchmann
Index (HHI) to measure horizontal concentration in a market
(DSB, 1997) . Economist Oliver Williamson showed that,
".
. .even a merger that caused a large increase in monopoly
power would be efficient if it produced only slight cost
reduction" (McChesney, 1993 p. 387). Therefore, high industry
concentration ratios are considered less important as an
indicator of monopoly power in today's antitrust cases.
This partly explains why the FTC approved Boeing's merger
with McDonnell Douglas in July 1997 allowing the new company
to command 70 percent of the commercial airline
manufacturing business (Fox, 1997)
.
b. Vertical Mergers
Vertical mergers add supplier product lines to the
firms existing production chain. The General Dynamics
acquisition of Teledyne Vehicle Systems combat vehicle
components business in 1996 provides and example of a
vertical merger. There is no clear evidence that vertical
mergers increase market power (Shepherd, 1997) . A more
difficult task is to actually determine the market effects
18
of vertical integration. The following excerpt from the DSB
(1997) highlights the problem.
The Task Force cannot assign a specific value or measure to this increased
vertical integration, as it did not find a way to specifically measure its
degree or scale, or to narrow it to a certain product area. Neither the
industry analysts, antitrust agency representatives, nor members of the
industry who spoke to the Task Force said that they measure industry
vertical integration, nor did they propose a mechanism to do so (D-3).
To expand on merger theory, the following section
discusses three issues relevant to defense firms' recent
merger activity.
2 . Current Issues Related to Defense Industry Mergers
There are many reasons for merger activity in the
defense industry. This section highlights three of those
issues: 1) Market performance of defense firm stock prices,
2) DOD ' s policy toward paying merger costs, and 3)
Competition
.
a. Defense firm stock market performance
The defense industry has historically expanded and
contracted with defense spending cycles. The difference in
today's environment from past declines in spending after
World War II and Vietnam is that the industry sees this draw
down as permanent . With the Cold War over and no clear
strategic threats on the horizon, defense spending has no
reason to rise significantly. Nevertheless since 1990, Wall
Street has rewarded the defense industry with increasing
19
stock prices. Paine Webber's weighted average defense stock
index (including Boeing) has outperformed the Standard and
Poor's 500 index handily in the last six years (Modzelewski
,
1996) . This notion is counterintuitive given that defense
spending was declining during this period. More puzzling
still is that defense stocks under performed the market
during the Reagan buildup of the 1980 's. Figure 2
graphically shows how an index of defense firms outperformed
the benchmark S&P 500.
CD r^ co O) o ,_ CN CD "S- in
CO CO CO CO o> en en CD a> en
o> o> en O) O) en O) OJ Ol O)
Calander Year




Figure 2 . Defense Industry Stock Performance
This surge in stock performance in the defense
industry directly coincides with an increased occurrence of
mergers in the last six years. Investors see value in firms
20
that consolidate, trim excess capacity and increase
efficiency.
b. DOD's Merger Reimbursement Policy
The second issue that some industry analysts
believe contributes to merger activity in defense firms is
DOD's policy to reimburse firms for merger costs. In July
1993, DOD allowed defense contractors to charge
restructuring costs to transferred flexibly priced contracts
after a merger. These costs could be charged only if they
were allowable under the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) and if a contracting officer determined that the
merger lowered overall costs to DOD (GAO, 1997b) . DOD in
effect pays for some merger costs that are imbedded in the
price of goods and services it buys. These costs, ". . .come
in the form of future adjustments to allowable costs for
weapons systems" (Fialka, 1996, p.A17)
.
Reimbursements only occur after the merger is
consummated and after the firm's projected restructuring
savings are certified by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition & Technology (USD,A&T). The five mergers
approved by DOD for reimbursements have spent $849 million
for restructuring activities. As of September 30, 1996, the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCCA) estimated that DOD
reimbursed about $179 million to contractors for
restructuring costs, but realized savings of $347 million
21
since July 1993 (GAO, 1997b) . Preserving competition in the
defense industry is the third and final issue.
c . Competition
From an economic standpoint, competition should
drive down costs and create incentive for innovation. The
acquiring firm's goal in most merger decisions is to enhance
or preserve their competitive position in their market. In
an environment of declining defense spending, defense firms
claim that they need to be big to afford to win contracts
and have enough money left for research and development
(R&D) (Cole, 1996) . Some pundits argue that having only a
few huge contractors will weaken DOD ' s negotiating power and
lead to higher prices (Egan, 1996) . While DOD ' s position
supports consolidation, its 1996 annual report recognized,
"Consolidation carries the risk that DOD will no longer
benefit from the competition that encourages defense
suppliers to reduce costs, improve quality, and stimulate
innovation" (GAO, 1997a, p. 21).
There exists differing views on the need for
competition, even among federal agencies. Concerning the
industry trend toward consolidation, Cole (1996) quoted the
FTC Chairman:
It's very hard to work out a cartel where you're talking about weapons
systems that are different from each other in a bid market in which there's
only one buyer, and that buyer has the right by law to check your books,
require re-bids, and do cost-benefit analysis (p. Al).
22
A Defense Science Board 1994 report on
consolidation challenges this view. The report concludes
that competition is preferred over DOD ' s regulatory and
auditing procedures to ensure the best mix of price and
quantity (GAO, 1997a) . Norman Augustine, Chairman of
Lockheed Martin, has endorsed industry consolidation to
achieve efficiencies since the early 1990 's. He believes
that consolidation is healthy, and states, "It's better to
have two strong companies than ten inefficient ones" (Egan,
1996, p. 51). In its 1994 report to DOD on the antitrust
issues of defense industry consolidation, the Defense
Science Board stated, "... reducing the number of firms
capable of developing a suitable design for a new weapon
system may lead to higher prices, poorer products, smaller
advances in technology, and a reduction in the number,
variety, or quality of the proposals that companies submit
to DOD" (GAO, 1997a, p. 22)
.
3 . Monopoly Theory
This section reviews literature relevant to monopoly
theory and introduces the key concept of abnormal earnings
which is the basis for the empirical research conducted
later in this thesis. George J. Stigler (1993) defines
monopoly as, "an enterprise that is the only seller of a
good or service" (p. 3 99) . The monopolist sets a price that
yields the largest profit and freely does so in the absence
23
of competition. Pure monopoly has just one firm that is
protected by high barriers to entry and inelastic demand.
Familiar examples of monopolies are electric, water, and
cable television companies that exist with the help of
government regulations. Pure competition exists on the
opposite pole from monopoly.
Effective competition requires strong mutual pressure
among firms and relative equality of size and market share.
Structurally, many firms must exist so that they can not
collude in price setting. There should be a minimum of five
comparable firms in a market for effective competition
(Shepherd, 19 97) . A high number of firms ensures that no one
firm is dominant and new competitors may easily enter the
market. Industry structure varies considerably between these
two extremes in any given market
.
Monopoly power allows firms to set prices higher than
in competitive markets yielding profits in excess of all
costs, including their cost of capital. Economic theory
concludes that industries with high seller concentration -
monopolies - "are likely to charge higher prices and earn
higher profits than industries with low concentration"
(Caves, 1992 ,p.l4). Most of the economic literature refers
to monopoly profits as economic rent, pure profit, or excess
profit. Since competitive firms earn only a normal profit,
earnings to cover all costs including the cost of capital,
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abnormal earnings are the earnings a firm reaps in excess of
a normal return on capital
.
Competitive firms may earn a small degree of abnormal
earnings in the short run, but easy entry into a given
market allows competitors to lower prices and return these
profits to zero. Monopolistic firms effectively continue
collecting abnormal earnings as long as entry into a market
remains difficult . The defense industry requirement for
capital intensive, specialized production equipment, access
to scientific and engineering talent, and the high costs of
preparing contract proposals all decrease the likelihood
that new firms will enter the market (GAO, 1997a) . Monopoly
contributes to many negative societal effects, but this
research only tries to measure the level of abnormal
earnings defense firms are collecting that may be due to
mergers
.
The source of abnormal earnings for a monopoly is
illustrated in Figure 3 . The intersection of the supply and
demand curves, Point A, yields competitive firms normal
profit through market price and quantity, Pc and Qc . Based
on where its marginal revenue equals marginal cost, Point B
on the demand curve, the monopolist sets price and output,
Pm and Qm . Since the price has been raised to customers,
the rectangle EBCD represents the increased dollar payments
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consumers pay. The monopoly retains these dollars as their
abnormal earnings. There is also a welfare loss to society
represented by triangle BAC that results from resource


















After: Shepherd (1997, pp. 45,46)
Figure 3 . Monopoly Pricing
Beyond the potential for paying higher prices for goods
and services, there is one additional effect of monopoly
power with critical importance to DOD. There exists two
diverging opinions on monopoly power's effect on Research
and Development (R&D) . William Shepherd describes the
negative effects from monopoly in this passage:
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A monopoly is under less pressure to invent new products or methods, and
so the generation of new ideas becomes voluntary. The pressures are also
less to translate new ideas into practical innovations. In fact, the pace of
innovation will be retarded, because innovations destroy the value of the
monopolist's existing products and processes. By altering the incentive
structure, monopoly discourages innovation (p. 46).
In contrast, Levy (1993) cites Joseph Schumpeter's
argument that since a monopoly reaps all the benefit from
R&D, it will have an incentive to invest more heavily in R&D
than a firm in a competitive industry. Competitive firms
have little incentive to engage in R&D since discoveries
would be quickly imitated by other firms. A competitive firm
would only receive a small share of the benefits from its
R&D expenses. "The monopolist shares the benefits of his R&D
with no other firm and will use a portion of its excess
profits to invest in R&D" (Douglas, 1982 p. 225).
Using Schumpeter's theory, DOD would prefer
monopolistic firms who invest their own capital in R&D over
a highly competitive market. However, the pricing power
afforded to the monopolist is detrimental to DOD's attempt
to keep weapon systems costs low.
D . SUMMARY
Shrinking defense procurement budgets have caused the
defense industry to consolidate as firms seek to increase
their market share. The profit motive has culminated in a
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highly concentrated defense industry ruled by three
aerospace behemoths; Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.
DOD reviews all mergers from a customer perspective
while FTC and DOJ reviews evaluate mergers from an anti-
trust standpoint. Research by Bain and Stigler suggested
that industries with four-firm concentrations were anti-
competitive. Conversely, Brozen and Demetz found
circumstances where increased profits by concentrated
industries were due to superior efficiency. Industry
concentration ratios and measures of vertical integration
are not effective in assessing monopoly power.
Economic theory suggests that monopolies earn abnormal
earnings through power to set prices above those offered in
a competitive market. If the defense industry displays such
power, it would have negative effects on DOD ' s ability to
receive the best value for its defense dollar.
In Chapter III, the research turns to the stock market
valuation and accounting data of defense firms to measure
expected abnormal earnings. The Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO)




III. EDWARDS-BELL-OHLSON (EBO) MODEL
A. OVERVIEW
The intent of this thesis is to analyze merger activity
in the defense industry in terms of its impact on the market
or monopoly power of the defense industry firms engaged in
the mergers. A central premise is that market power will
manifest itself in the ability to produce abnormal earnings.
Thus, the impact of a merger can be assessed by observing
changes in anticipated abnormal earnings resulting from the
merger. This chapter introduces the EBO model, which will be
used as the framework for determining abnormal earnings
.
The chapter first introduces the EBO model as it exists
in the literature, as a model for determining the intrinsic
value of a firm, and hence stock value. The model is then
transformed to a form that can be used to determine measures
of expected abnormal earnings
.
The original Edwards-Bell -Ohlson (EBO) model was
developed by Columbia University professor James Ohlson to
analyze a firm's market value as it relates to future
earnings, book values and dividends (Ohlson, 1995) . The
model employs abnormal (sometimes referred to as residual
earnings or income) earnings as a variable that influences




This accounting based performance measure is defined by earnings minus a
charge for the use of capital as measured by beginning-of-period book
value multiplied by the cost of capital (Ohlson, 1995, p. 662).
Professor Lee of the University of Michigan
successfully applies the EBO model to estimate value per
share of publicly traded firms (Wooley, 1997) . His analysis
has discovered over and undervalued stocks in relation to
current stock price using the model
.
B. ORIGINAL MODEL
The EBO model is mathematically identical to the
present value of future dividend models (DDM) and equivalent
to the present value of Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF)
(Lee, 1996) . The EBO model measures wealth creation through
reinvested earnings verses wealth distribution through
payment of dividends. EBO s focus on only residual income
and not the entire future cash flow gives it a primary
advantage over using a DCF model . This property was the
critical criterion in choosing the model for this research.
The EBO model in simplest form is shown as the
equation below:
Firm Value at time t = Book value of equity at time t +
Present value of all future abnormal earnings
This conceptualization of firm value rests on three
assumptions adopted by Ohlson (1995)
:




• Dividends reduce book value without affecting
current earnings
.
• Abnormal earnings are current earnings minus a
charge for the use of capital.
The most general representation of the model is shown
in Equation 1:
E\-(TeXBo) E2-(TeXB\) E3-(TeXB2)





Po = Bo +-^^ - +—— - — rr^+... (1)
Where
:
Pt = Firm value at time t
Et = Earnings at time t
Bt = Book value at time t
re = Cost of Equity Capital
Book value is based on accounting numbers from
financial statements, and assumes the clean surplus relation
that says, "a firm's book value should be changed only by
dividends and earnings" (Lee, 1996 p. 33) . Thus, Book value
at time t = Bt = Bt _i + E t - Dt , where, Dt = Dividends at
time t
.
A firm generates abnormal earnings when it earns a
higher than "normal" rate of return on its equity. A normal
rate of return is a return equal to the cost of equity
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capital (re ) . Thus, abnormal earnings in any period is
represented by:
Abnormal Earnings = Earnings - (Cost of equity capital
x Beginning book value)
or :
Abnormal Earnings = E t - (re x B t _!)
Conceptually, the model simply expresses the relationship
between three items: Firm Value (P) , Book Value (B) , and
Future abnormal earnings, such that:
Pt = Bt + PVFAE where,




If a firm could only earn a normal return equal to its cost
of equity capital on its book value, then abnormal earnings
would be zero. Thus, P t would equal Bt ; there would be no
reason for investors to value a firm (P t ) above its current
book value (B t ) . Firm value should exceed book value only
to the extent of future abnormal earnings that could be
generated on the book value. The degree to which Pt exceeds
B t would depend upon the amount and timing of the expected
abnormal earnings
.
These same relationships introduced in Equation (1) can
be expressed in terms of rates of return, where:
Normal rate of return = re
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Abnormal rate of return = AROE, = ROE, - re
Thus, Equation (1) can be rewritten in terms of Rates of
Return (ROE) as in Equation (2) below:
(ROEi-T.) (ROE2 - r.) {ROE. - r.)





a+ro a+r.y (1 + r.y
(2)
or in terms of Abnormal Rates of Return (AROE) in Equation
(3) :










In this formulation, the numerator terms of the model
are nothing more than the abnormal rate of return times the
book value. The denominators discount the abnormal earnings
by the appropriate discount rate, the cost of capital. Note
that Equation (2) is a most general representation of the
model. It permits different ROE ' s in different periods,
changing book values (B t ) in different periods, and further
permits abnormal earnings to persist indefinitely.
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C. MODEL TRANSFORMED
An integral part of this research involves transforming
the standard EBO model from its original purpose of
forecasting stock price to forecasting abnormal returns of a
firm. Ultimately, this is accomplished by rearranging the
terms in the original model to solve for AROE instead of
firm value. Since abnormal earnings may signal monopoly
power, the model provides a procedural tool to analyze
defense firms pre and post -merger.
There are two steps in solving for AROE. The first is a
straight forward conceptual transformation based on the idea
that
:
Firm Value - Book Value = Present Value of Future Abnormal Earnings
or:
P, - Bt = PVFAE
The second requires answering the question: If the present
value of future abnormal earnings (PVFAE) is known, how can
the annual rate of abnormal return (AROE) be determined? For
any single value for PVFAE, there are an unlimited number of
patterns for future earnings that could produce the given
PVFAE. Those patterns would result from various combinations
of re , B t and ROE t extended over various future years.
Transforming PVFAE into a yearly measure of AROE requires
four assumptions; 1) the security market is efficient, 2)
annual return on equity is constant, 3) book value grows at
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a constant rate, and 4) monopoly power implies the ability
to earn abnormal earnings indefinitely.
1. The Security Market is Efficient
Market stock prices (P) can be used as the fair value
or intrinsic value of a firm if the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) is assumed to hold. EMH states that stock
prices accurately reflect all available information about
the firm (Dyckman & Morse, 1986) . Therefore, a firm's stock
price reflects the investors' best evaluation of a firm's
earning power by discounting earnings (and dividends) into
the current market value of the stock. Hence, current market
price can be used to determine a fair measure of PVFAE
.
2 . Annual Return on Equity is Constant
The EBO model permits ROE to change over time (ROEx,
ROE 2 , etc. in equation 2) without restriction. When using
the EBO model in its original form to estimate intrinsic
value, a single value (Pq) can be determined from any set of
future returns (ROE 1# ROE2 , etc.). Normally, ROE is
estimated using individual yearly earnings forecasts
generated by independent securities analysts. Therefore,
the EBO model permits changing yearly values for ROE.
In this application, constant ROE is assumed from a
practical purpose. It permits a single ROE measure to be
determined from a single PVFAE measure. Without this
assumption, the calculation of a single annual return figure
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is not possible. Given this assumption: ROE! = ROE 2 = ROE 3 ,
etc., and AROEi = AROE 2 = AROE 3 , etc.
3 . Book Value Grows at a Constant Rate
The EBO model permits book value to change over time
(B
,
B lt B 2 , etc. in equation 2) without restrictions,
except that B t = B t _ 1 + E t - Dt . The rate at which B t grows
depends upon E t - D t , the portion of earnings retained or
not paid out as dividends. For simplicity, and following
typical usage, the rate of growth in book value is assumed
constant. Growth for this model reflects the portion of
earnings that are reinvested as retained earnings by the
firm and show up in the book value. This is equivalent to
assuming a constant dividend payout rate and a constant
retention rate. The following notation is consistent with
these assumptions:
k = Dividend payout rate
(1-k) = Retention rate = (E - D)/E
g = growth rate of B = (1-k) *ROE
Rewriting equation (2) incorporating the assumptions of
constant ROE and g renders Equation (4)
:
(ROE -re) (ROE-Xe) , (ROE-u)
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Substituting AROE for (ROE-re ) , dividing by B , and
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4. Monopoly Power Implies the Ability to Earn
Abnormal Earnings Indefinitely.
The general EBO model accommodates all assumptions
regarding the period of time over which abnormal earnings
may be expected to exist. The model can represent a
perpetuity or stop at a finite number of years depending on
the assumptions used. For example, Lee (1996) uses
analyst's earnings forecasts to project growth in ROE.
Normally, he allows the ROE rate to revert to the industry
average after the eighth year of forecasts. This is
consistent with abnormal returns being eroded away as other
firms innovate or enter a competitive market.
All firms have the ability to earn some level of
abnormal earnings in the short run until market forces
revert to equilibrium. This version assumes a competitive
market with no entry restrictions. In a truly competitive
market, a firm should always generate an ROE equal to its
cost of capital, in perpetuity. In contrast, a firm with
monopoly power would be able to restrict competition, resist
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the forces which would return earnings to normal, and hence
generate abnormal earnings indefinitely. This idea is
consistent with abnormal returns being a perpetuity as in
the EBO model. Thus, this research assumes that defense
firms will earn abnormal earnings in perpetuity due to the
difficulty competitors have entering the market.
If AROE is treated as existing indefinitely, a
perpetuity, then the right hand side of Equation (5) , PVFAE,
simplifies algebraically to Equation (6)
.
Po (AROE) (ROE - r.)
—
-\ = PVFAE = - - = - (6)
Bo re - g re - g
Solving Equation (6) for ROE transforms the model into
equation (7) , a form that provides an annual value for
return based on the expectations embedded in the stock
price. Equation (7) is the basis for the research and will
be applied to assess the changes in returns for defense





Subtracting the cost of capital from the ROE in turn
measures the abnormal portion of return.
AROE t = Abnormal return = (ROE t - re )
Therefore, the basic variables required to solve for
abnormal return consist of: stock price, dividend payout
ratio, book value, and cost of capital.
D . SUMMARY
EBO is a proven accounting valuation model that focuses
on wealth creation not wealth distribution. Monopoly power
manifests itself in the ability of firms to command abnormal
earnings. The transformed version of the EBO model provides
the tool to segregate abnormal earnings of defense firms.
Chapter IV discusses the methodology for conducting the
research which will analyze abnormal returns of defense





This chapter explains the methods used to conduct the
research. Data analysis was conducted in five steps. First,
an investigation of monopoly power required a method to
measure the abnormal earnings of defense firms. Chapter III
discussed the model selected for this purpose. Transforming
the EBO model provided a usable tool for the analysis and
guided the data collection phase of the research. Second, a
sample of defense firms involved in major mergers was
selected. Third, market data, industry data and financial
data from these firms was collected from various sources and
entered onto spreadsheets to calculate variables needed for
the EBO model. Fourth, the data was smoothed and made
consistent across the population for inclusion in the model.
Finally, abnormal earnings were calculated for each firm and
analyzed between periods in the merger process.
B. SAMPLE FIRMS AND MERGER EVENTS
1. Sample Identification
Since the objective of this research was to analyze the
impact of defense industry mergers, the sample selection
focused on the aerospace and defense industry group as
listed by such investment resources as Value Line and
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Forbes. The primary criteria for selecting the sample are
listed below:
• Only merger/acquisitions with a dollar value over $2
billion were included.
• Each firm prior to the merger derived over 25% of
its revenue from defense related sales (Defense News
1995, 1996, 8c S&P 1993, 1994) .
• Each firm prior to the merger was among the top 2
U.S. defense firms measured by total defense sales for
the year analyzed (Defense News 1995, 1996, & S&P 1993,
1994) .
• Firms were separate public companies with individual
stock prices before and after the merger.
• The merger announcement occurred no earlier than
1994.
These restrictions limited the sample size because many
acquisitions involve only the defense segments of a larger
company. For example, Northrop Grumman s $3.6 billion
acquisition of Westinghouse Electronic Systems in 1996 was
not analyzed since no separate financial data or stock price
existed for that division of Westinghouse. Based on the
above criteria, seven merger/acquisition events were
selected involving 12 separate firms. By August 1997, the 12
initial firms had consolidated into only five with two more
mergers still pending. Table 2 lists the selected firms and
includes the date of the announcement and effective date the
merger was completed. The quoted value is the total amount
of stock, cash or combination of the two the acquiring firm
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paid for the acquiree . Acquiring firms are listed above the
acquiree . The right side of the table shows the name of the
merged firm.
















































2 . Time Period Covered by the Merger Sample
Prior to 1994, no merger of publicly traded defense
firms was valued above $2 billion. Table 1 in Chapter II
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listed 38 notable defense mergers since 1994. Of those, 24
did not involved separately traded public companies and 28
were below the $2 billion threshold. The selected sample
represents all mergers above $2 billion since 1994 that
could be analyzed using stock prices. The $2 billion value
cap is justified by the need to analyze large defense
companies and also to keep the sample size within the scope
of data collection constraints.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS
Mergers occur at different times and span varying
periods of time before they are consummated. Even after they
are consummated, activities are on going in both firms to
combine their operations. With that in mind, mergers become
an ongoing process rather than a single event. This trait
required that certain stages in the merger process be
defined for analysis. The stages chosen are listed below.
• Premerger Period
• The Announcement Date (Immediate effect)
• Interim Period (Fully digested effect)
• Post-Merger Period 1 (Immediate expectation of new
firm)
• Post-Merger Period 2 (Slightly digested expectation
of the firm)
In addition to identifying the process each merger
undergoes, time constraints for the pre and post -merger
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stages were specified to make analysis of each one
















Figure 4 . Merger Event Timeline
Each stage along the timeline offers a new set of data
to base the analysis of abnormal earnings for the firms
involved in the merger process. Excel spreadsheets were
constructed to evaluate the value of each firm's abnormal
earnings over the merger stages. The following discussion
describes the merger stages and presents a methodology for
choosing them.
1 . Premerger Period
The pre-merger period was constrained to the trailing
three months prior to the announcement date. This period
provided enough data for use in the EBO model and reflected
the most recent status of the firms' book value, stock
price, and cost of capital just prior to the merger
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announcement. The research assumes data from this period,
particularly stock prices, are "clean" of the affects of
information about the pending merger.
2 . The Announcement Date
The announcement date is the point where the market
officially becomes informed of a forthcoming merger. Merger
announcements send signals to the market. If the
announcement is anticipated by the market, then the
information has no affect since the knowledge of the merger
is already reflected in the stock price (value) of the firms
involved. When the announcement is not anticipated, the
content of that information causes immediate reaction in the
market. Investors reassess the future earnings prospects of
the firms involved and stock prices change accordingly.
Therefore, it makes sense to evaluate what effect, albeit
"immediate", the announcement information had on the market
and the investors' expectations of a firm's ability to earn
abnormal returns. To capture this effect requires a
comparison of abnormal earnings before the merger
announcement with abnormal earnings assessed the date
investors could act on the knowledge of the merger
announcement information.
3 . Interim Period
The interim period was defined as the period between
the merger announcement and the consummation of the merger.
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The length of this period varied from merger to merger. This
period is significant in the sense that the time before the
consummation gives investors opportunity to "digest" the
news of the merger and change their assessment of firm
value. An assessment of abnormal earnings during this period
would likely differ from the assessment at the moment of the
announcement. This difference would represent the market
adjusting its expectations of future abnormal earnings of
the participating firms as a result of "fully digesting"
information concerning the forthcoming merger, rendering a
more accurate measurement for analysis. The two most
recently planned mergers between Raytheon and Hughes Defense
and Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are still in the
interim stage. Data up to 30 September 1997 was used for the
analysis for these two mergers.
4. Post-Merger Period 1
The first post -merger period is defined as the time
between the consummation of the merger and the ending date
of the new firm's next quarterly financial report. The
merger is not over until the new firm absorbs the plants,
equipment, and employees of the acquired firm. The post-
merger period then could be six months, one year, or five
years depending on how long that takes. However, the market
anticipates these events and values a firm accordingly. The
first data available for the newly merged firm will permit a
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fair initial assessment of the expected abnormal earnings.
However, using the same line of reasoning applied earlier
to the measurement at the announcement date, this period
would render a "first impression" or "immediate" reaction to
the new firm by the market
.
The new firm at this point is probably struggling with
a new capital structure, redundant facilities and functions,
and differing corporate cultures. No doubt, the market will
recognize this to some extent, but uncertainty about the
future may be high.
(Boeing's post-merger results with McDonnell Douglas
are only available through this period.)
5. Post-Merger Period 2
A second post-merger period was defined to provide a
more "digested" measure of abnormal earnings later on the
timeline. The period is short enough to isolate affects of
the individual merger analyzed yet long enough to allow the
new firm to absorb the acquired firm and restructure at
least some of it's processes. The second period begins at
the end of period one and extends to the new firm's first
annual report. This period allows for at least six months of
data from four of the seven mergers.
Several firms analyzed from the sample have engaged in
more than one merger. Subsequent mergers by the same firm
provided an extended sequence of observations over time for
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that firm. For instance, post-merger results exist for the
Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger in 1995. The new Lockheed
Martin also has abnormal returns calculated from 1996 data
for analysis with the Loral merger. In addition, Lockheed
Martin has abnormal earnings calculated from 1997 data for
the Northrop Grumman deal. Other observations of abnormal
earnings from subsequent mergers can be used with Raytheon
and Northrop Grumman to assess the longer term effects of
their merger activity over time.
D. DATA COLLECTION
Data collection focused on two themes: 1) what data to
use, and 2) from what time period was it to be collected.
First, the data had to provide values for the variables of
the transformed EBO model. Chapter III described these
variables as: stock price, cost of equity capital, book
value, and dividend payout ratio. Second, the data had to
provide values for the variables for each of the five stages
in the merger process outlined above. The following sections
describe the types of data collected and sources.
1. Stock Prices
Stock prices for currently traded firms were fairly
easy to attain from Internet charting and quote services
(DLJdirect, 1997) . Media General Financial Services
provided monthly stock price data on S&P 500 companies
current until April 1997 (MEGA Insight, 1997) . Finding
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historical stock price information for "Dead Wood"
companies, those that were merged with other firms and
ceased to trade publicly, proved more difficult.
Once a company is de- listed from an exchange, most
Internet quote services drop the symbol and the associated
data. Reference publications such as Moody's, S&P Stock
Encyclopedia and Value Line only list stock prices of firms
in yearly or quarterly high and lows. This gap in data
required a detailed search of the Wall Street Journal on
microfilm dating back to 1994 to capture price data for the
earlier mergers.
2. Cost of Capital Data
Theoretically, the cost of equity capital consists of
two components, a risk free rate and a risk premium,
specific to an individual firm. The cost of capital and its
calculation is discussed in more detail later in the
chapter, but data collection related to both components was
necessary.
a. T-Bill Rates
The analysis used three month treasury bill (T-
bill) rates for the risk free rate of return in the cost of
capital calculation. The US Dept . of Treasury maintains an
historical listing of all bill and bond yields at their
Internet World Wide Web site (DOT, 1997) . Although some
data was available for weekly auctions of the T-bill, the
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same level of detail was not provided previous to 1995.
Also, most of 1997 's data was not posted on the Treasury's
Web Site. Charles Schwab Investor Services On Line provided
treasury rate data the most recent yields through its
information agreement with First Call. Appendix (B)
contains a listing of the average monthly three month
treasury bill yields used for the cost of capital
calculation.
b. Industry Risk Premium Data
The analysis used a comprehensive list of risk
premiums calculated for individual industry groups according
to their Standard Industrial Code (SIC) (Woolley, 1997)
.
Moody's Profiles of S&P Companies on CD ROM, found in the
Knox Library, contained the best listing for SIC codes for
the sample defense firms. However, different rating systems
characterize a firm's business differently. It is not
accurate to group a single firm into one SIC since it may
pursue diverse lines of business. This is the case with all
defense firms analyzed. Therefore, a composite risk premium
was calculated to derive the cost of capital . The method
used is described later in this chapter.
3 . Book Value
The book value of the selected firms was calculated by
subtracting the sum of the total liabilities and preferred
stock (if any) from the accounting value assigned to its
51
total assets. This value was divided by the number of fully
diluted shares outstanding to render the book value per
share. The firm's financial data was taken from the balance
sheet on relevant quarterly and annual reports. All firms
responded to the researcher's request for hard copies of
current and previous financial reports. Where gaps in the
data existed, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
World Wide Web EDGAR database provided many of the essential
company reports, in some cases dating back to 1994 (SEC,
1997) . Other sources included historical data from Value
Line and S&P Company Profiles for the "Dead Wood" firms
(Value Line, 1994, & S&P, 1993-1996).
4 . Dividend Payout Ratio
The dividend payout ratio is the percentage of net
income the firm pays out in the form of dividends. It was
used to calculate the constant growth rate for the EBO model
based on historical data. The dividend payout ratio is
calculated by dividing the dividend paid in a given
reporting period by the net income or earnings in the same
period. Financial data was taken directly from the firm's
Income Statement, when available, and from historical data
published in the S&P Stock Market Encyclopedia (1993-1996)
and Value Line (1994) . The historical growth rate used in
the analysis was calculated using annual financial data
since 1990, as discussed later in the chapter. (The company
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data tables in Appendix B show the dividend payout ratios
for the ending date of the corresponding annual and
quarterly periods. However, this figure is provided for
reference only.)
E. NORMALIZING EBO MODEL INPUTS
The company data sheets in Appendix B contain raw
accounting data from specific points in time, (e.g., the
ending date of the financial reporting period) . Each
variable used in the EBO model was normalized using a
standard method to represent a value for a given period of
time during the merger process. Therefore, the resulting
abnormal return calculated from the transformed EBO model is
designed to represent a value for a period of time, one of
the stages in the merger process, rather than a single
specific point in time. Specific methods used for each EBO
variable are discussed next. Individual firm Abnormal
Earnings Worksheets contain the actual inputs and final




The closing market stock price was used only for the
announcement date. The price was taken from the first full
trading day after the merger announcement was made public.
In some cases, the announcements were made at the close of
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trading on Friday or over a weekend. Therefore, the closing
price from the following Monday was used.
In all period calculations, the model used an average
stock price. Stock prices were averaged using one of two
methods depending on the time period.
1) For periods of three months or greater:
-Average of firm's monthly high and low price
-Average of the monthly averages calculated
2) For periods less than three months:
-Average of firm's weekly high and low price
-Average of the weekly averages calculated
In situations where merger events did not fall neatly at the
end of the month, weekly price data filled the gap to the
nearest whole month. Therefore, some calculations are a
combination of averaged weekly price data and averaged
monthly price data.
2 . Cost of Capital
The cost of equity capital (re ) consists of two
components
:
Cost of Capital (re) = Risk free rate + Risk premium
The cost of equity capital (re ) differs between industries
and individual firms. In theory, measures of re should be
firm specific, but "there is little consensus on how this
discount rate should be determined" (Frankel & Lee, 1996, p.
8) . For this study, the cost of equity capital (re ) used
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risk premium values for major SIC's that Lee provided with
the Internet version of Woolley's (1997) Forbes article.
Lee used an established investment model, the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) , to compute a risk premium for
different industries (Woolley, 1997) . Adding this risk
premium to the yield on a 3 month treasury bill (the risk
free rate) , renders a fairly accurate cost of equity capital
for a firm (Lee, 1996) .
In this research, since all firms in the sample
conducted business in several major SIC's, a composite risk
premium was calculated for each firm based on sales volume.
The risk free rate incorporated an average of the three
month T-bill rate in keeping with Lee's usage of the CAPM
model
.
a. Composite Risk Premium
The composite risk premium was calculated as a
weighted average of the industry risk premiums for the SIC
codes in which a firm operated, using the firm's percentage
of sales in certain lines of business. Percentage of sales
best represents the firm's resources devoted to those
markets. Sales data was taken from annual reports and S&P
company profiles (S&P, 1993-1996) . Table 3 contains Grumman
Corp . ' s SIC codes, percent of sales by SIC code, Lee's risk
premium for each SIC code, and the composite risk premium.
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Composite risk premiums for all sample firms and a
description of each code is contained in Appendix B.



















Table 3 demonstrates that Grumman Corp . '
s
composite risk premium is higher than if attributed only to
SIC 3721 (Aircraft), its dominant line of business. The
composite captures the portion of a firm's business with a
higher or lower risk premiums.
These composite risk premiums assume no major
change in lines of business during a year, except when the
merger is consummated. At this point, the new firm's
percentage of sales in each line of business will change.
Therefore, post -merger periods used the risk premium
calculated from data of the combined firm's first annual
report following the consummation. For the periods prior to
the consummation date, the original firm's risk premium was
calculated from its last annual report and was projected
forward.
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In Boeing's recent merger with McDonnell Douglas,
Boeing's post -merger risk premium was calculated by
averaging the two firms premerger risk premiums, since no
new sales data existed. This assumes that Boeing simply-
added McDonnell Douglas's business lines to theirs.
b. Risk Free Rate
The risk free rate was based on the three month T-
bill yield. Three month T-bills are sold four to five times
per month. Each auction renders bills with slightly
different discount rates and yields depending on market
rates. Data for the average monthly T-bill yield from 1993
to September 1997 was collected.
The objective, consistent with measures of price
and book value, was to use a risk free rate associated with
each merger stage. Time periods of each stage varied and T-
bill yields changed daily. Therefore, the analysis
identified the last day of each merger stage as a starting
point for calculating the risk free rate. /An average of the
monthly T-bill yield during the three months previous to the
end date of the merger stage was calculated.
Whole month T-bill yields were used if a merger
stage's end date fell plus or minus ten days from the first
of the month. Otherwise, the weighted average for the
fraction of a month was determined and then the trailing
three month average was calculated. For example, the
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Lockheed and Martin Marietta merger was consummated on 15
March 1995, ending the interim period. The risk free rate
used for that period was the sum of; (.5) (average March
yield) + (average February yield) + (average January yield)
+ (.5) (average December yield), divided by three. The
trailing three month average approach standardized the risk
free rate calculation across all merger stages.
3 . Book value
A firm's book value changes constantly based on
operating, financing and investment activities. Book value
calculated directly from accounting data in financial
statements represents a value only for the ending date of
the report. The objective in normalizing Book Value (Bv) was
twofold: 1) to project a reasonable estimate for Bv at the
merger announcement, and 2) to calculate an average Bvavg
across periods of the merger event. Since both price (P) and
Bv are critical variables in the EBO model, accurate results
depended on both inputs meeting up at the same point in
time. In other words, if the closing price was used on the
merger announcement date, then there should exist a specific
book value on that date as well. Similarly, when P is
averaged over a period, Bv should also be averaged over the
same period.
This research used a single method to estimate both
point Bv's (for announcement date) and Bvavg (for merger
event periods) . First, the change in book values from
adjacent financial reports closest to the announcement date
or end date of the merger event period was calculated.
Second, depending on the period of time involved, Bv's were
extrapolated forward to the target dates of the merger event
using the change between periods as the slope of a line and
the beginning period's book value as the y- intercept. Figure
5 illustrates this process as a function of time.
Values in the graph are the actual data used for
calculating Lockheed Martin's point and average book values.
The book values for 31 March and 30 June are $31.56 and
32.63 respectively. The change in book value between these
two quarterly periods is used to extrapolate a point book
value for 7 April ($31.64) and 7 July ($32.71). The book
value of $32.71 was used to calculate abnormal earnings for
Lockheed Martin as of the merger announcement date with
Northrop Grumman. The premerger period book value was
calculated by taking the average of the two point values on
7 April and 7 July; the three month period before the
announcement date. This value is represented on Figure 5 as
BvAvg , $32.18.
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Figure 5. Extrapolating Book Value
Finally, either the point estimate Bv was applied to
the model for specific date calculations or the average
between the merger period beginning and end date Bv ' s was
calculated. Utilizing a spreadsheet simplified this rather
straightforward process.
All book values used in the analysis were extrapolated
unless the merger event date took place plus or minus 5 days
from a quarterly or annual report. For example, Raytheon
announced its plans to acquire E-Systems on 3 April 1995,
only three days from the end date of their 31 March 1995
quarterly report. In this case, the Bv calculated directly
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from the 31 March financial statement was used as the
measure of Bv for 3 April, the merger announcement date.
4 . Growth Rate/Dividend Payout
Recall from Chapter III that the EBO model uses the
firm's earnings retention rate as the measure of growth in
book value and retention rate is a direct result of dividend
payout policy. A firm's dividend policy is typically
consistent in dollar amount. Therefore, fluctuations in the
payout ratio usually depends on fluctuations in earnings.
Annual historical annual data since 1990 was used to
calculate the annual dividend payout ratio. The retention
rate was then calculated and averaged over the years since
1990. Years with negative earnings were eliminated for the
calculation. A negative earnings year is most likely a
result of extraordinary charges against income and not
normal for a going concern. This variable was the only one
that relys on data prior to the merger in the calculation.
The newly merged firms without a dividend payout
history were more difficult to assign a retention ratio.
The research assumed they would follow the same policy as
the acquiring firm. Data from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon
support this view since their payout ratios remained
relatively constant after acquiring Loral and E-Systems
respectively. Individual spreadsheet calculations for the
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historical growth rates (retention rate) used in the
analysis are contained in Appendix B.
F . SUMMARY
A population of twelve firms and seven large, defense
industry mergers was selected for analysis. Data was
collected from a diverse set of sources including;
established investment reference publications, company
financial statements, government databases, periodicals, and
the Internet . This chapter introduced the merger event
timeline as a basis for the empirical research. The research
methodology made every attempt to normalize all data across
the merger periods and between sample firms.
Chapter V introduces each sample firm, presents the
resulting abnormal earnings expected for those firms over
the range of each merger event, and analyzes those results
in terms of monopoly power.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter is divided into two interrelated sections,
data presentation and data analysis. The data presentation
section chronologically describes each merger and provides a
discussion of the participating firms. It outlines the dates
for the merger stages and characterizes each firm in terms
of its products and size by revenue and percent of defense
sales. The sample mergers' Abnormal Rates of Return on
Equity (AROE) resulting from the transformed EBO Model are
presented for each merger stage.
The Data Analysis section makes observations and
interprets the resulting abnormal return in terms of
quantifiable changes between stages in the merger process.
The analysis identifies patterns of resulting AROE measures
and draws conclusions concerning the mergers effect on
expectations for future abnormal returns.
B. DATA PRESENTATION
This section describes each merger in the sample and
characterizes the firms involved. First, each description
identifies the dates of the merger event, the value or price
paid for that merger or acquisition, and the method of
accounting used. Second, each firm is "sized" in terms of
total annual revenue and percent defense sales. Also, a
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summary of their major defense programs introduces the
reader to the firm's business activities (this relates
directly to the firm's SIC code) . Next, the post-merger firm
is "sized"; again in terms of total revenue and defense
sales. Unusual circumstances are also mentioned if
applicable. Finally, the resulting AROE data for each merger
is presented.
Many numbers and percentages are mentioned in this
section. For ease of presentation and reading, these items
are not cited separately. Rather, a summary of the data
sources is listed in Table 4. In all cases where data was
taken from an alternate source, that source is cited within
the text
.
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1 . Northrop Acquires Grumman
Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC) was created when Northrop
Corp. completed its merger with Grumman Corp. by purchasing
its outstanding shares for $2.17 Billion or $62 per share.
Northrop was not the first to express interest in buying
Grumman. Martin Marietta initially offered $55 per share
for Grumman on 7 March 1994. Fearful of losing its core
position in the declining defense market (B-2 bomber)
,
Northrop counter-offered $60 per share on 10 March 1994.
After negotiations between the two companies, Northrop
sweetened the bid to $62 per share on 4 April which was
accepted by Grumman stockholders. Grumman s shares ceased
trading after Friday, 15 April 1994 once Northrop had
tendered 93.4 percent of Grumman ' s stock. The merger was
officially consummated with the SEC on 18 May 1994; the
shortest interim period of the seven mergers
analyzed. ("Northrop Says", 1994)
Grumman Corp. designed and manufactured military
aircraft, space systems, electronic systems, and provided
information services. Approximately 90 percent of Grumman
s
$3.2 billion 1993 revenue was in defense sales. In 1993,
Grumman s major programs included: production of the EA-6B
and E-2C Hawkeye , upgrade work to its F-14 and A-6 aircraft,
development of the E-8A Joint STARS, electronics for
aircraft, and computerized test equipment. Grumman also
fabricated and sold aluminum truck bodies
.
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Northrop Corp. produced 40 percent of the components
for the F-18 aircraft, manufactured the B-2 aircraft, and
made fuselages for the 747 airliner. Total revenue in 1993
was $5 billion with 90 percent going to defense sales.
Electronics and communication activities made up 12 percent
of sales which included the design and construction of
broadcasting stations, and manufacturing avionics for
aircraft and missiles. Northrop' s B-2 production accounted
for 50 percent of sales in 1993 and a total production of 20
aircraft was to be completed in 1997.
Northrop Grumman restructured into five segments during
1994; military aircraft, B-2 stealth bomber, electronics and
systems integration, commercial aircraft, and data systems.
The merged firm had total revenue of $6.7 billion in 1994
and ranked fourth in U.S. defense revenue for that year.
Table 5 provides the variables used for the Northrop,
Grumman merger with the resulting AROE expressed in
percentage terms.
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2. Lockheed Corp. Merges with Martin Marietta
Lockheed Martin (LMT) is a result of Lockheed Corp.
(LK) merging with Martin Marietta (ML) on 15 March 1995 with
the issuance of new LMT stock worth $9 billion. Lockheed
stockholders received 1.63 shares of new LMT stock for each
share of Lockheed, while Martin Marietta stockholders
received new LMT shares on a 1:1 basis. The merger was
announced on Monday, 29 April 1994 after the close of
trading. LMT began trading on 15 March 1995 when the merger
was consummated.
Martin Marietta's strength was in electronic systems
found in many weapons systems. Total revenue in 1994 was
$9.8 billion, 80 percent of which was to defense sales.
Martin Marietta's major programs included: the Titan and
Atlas space launch vehicles, satellite and spacecraft
systems (including the external tanks for the space
shuttle), missiles, defense electronics encompassing
navigation and targeting systems, ship combat systems, radar
and control systems. They were also a major aircraft
component manufacturer and assembler.
Lockheed Corp . ' s strength was in assembly of aircraft
and other weapons systems. Total revenue in 1994 was $13
billion with 64 percent going to defense sales. Lockheed's
major programs included: the F-16 and F-22 fighter aircraft,
F-117A stealth fighter, C-5, C-130, C-141 transports, P-3
anti-submarine aircraft, various classified defense
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programs, Trident submarine launched missile, Milstar
satellites, and other space programs.
Both companies had an acquisition strategies prior to
this merger. Lockheed purchased General Dynamics fighter
aircraft business in 1993 for $1.52 billion. Martin Marietta
acquired General Electric ' s aerospace division for $3.05
billion in April 1993, and General Dynamics space systems
division in December 1993 for $208 million.
Lockheed Martin's 1995 annual report recorded total
revenues of $22.8 billion. Lockheed Martin became the number
one defense firm worldwide when ranked by defense sales for
1995 with $14.3 billion.
Appendix B contains annual data for 1993 and 1994 from
both firms. Quarterly reports were unavailable from 1994,
but six month data from June 1994 was used to extrapolate
book value for the premerger period and announcement date.
Table 6 provides the variables used for the Lockheed, Martin

























o X CD u O m










O Q3_ 03_ 0) 0) ID
0) O CCD oO o 03rr
iL




















k to o -N CD 7?























03 *» —*. oo cn co 1





bo k CO O -fc. -J 7T
00 CO "o CD CO CD co
3
CD03 00 CO ~J cn ^ ~-l O CD
^5 s -&. 0- —k cn > Q.
c
<0 <& <fi CO














0^ 00 ^9. -56s -J cn 3'






*». cn CD •**> *. _k CO CD
CD
a.
CO r* k *>. cn CO *». cn —*


















CO cn to CO O0 k> cn -|





























































































^ N) cn cn CO cn
^5 ^50^ cn 0^ ~50^ cn
70
3. Raytheon Acquires E-Systems
Raytheon (RTN) completed its $2.3 billion purchase of
E-Systems (ESY) on 8 May 1995. ESY stockholders were paid
$64 per share in cash. RTN financed the acquisition mostly
with new long term debt. ESY continued to operate as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Raytheon. The merger was
announced on 3 April 1995.
E-Systems was a major producer of advanced electronic
systems and products for defense markets . Tonal revenue in
1994 was $2 billion; defense sales accounted for 89 percent.
Many of the corporation's military programs were classified.
Reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence programs
accounted for over 60 percent of ESY's 1993 revenue. ESY
also provided command and control systems for information
gathering, data processing and display. The company made
missile steering and tracking systems, and aircraft
navigation aids. It also provided aircraft overhaul and
maintenance services for the Air Force and commercial
carriers
.
In 1994, Raytheon operated in four distinct business;
commercial and defense electronics, engineering and
construction, aircraft, and major appliances. Its 1994
revenue was $10 billion with approximately 44 percent coming
from defense sales. RTN's defense electronics division
produced Stinger, HAWK and Patriot surface-to-air missile
systems, Sidewinder, Sparrow, and AMRAAM air-to-air
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missiles, radar and communication equipment. Its aircraft
division made Hawker corporate jets, and Beech turboprops
and small jets. The construction division built large power
plants and petroleum refining facilities. Major appliance
brand names include: Amana, Caloric, and Speed Queen.
Raytheon purchased E-Systems for its strong backlog in
orders for reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
programs that were less sensitive to declines in defense
procurement. In 1994, RTN purchased British Aerospace's
Corporate Jet Division which added medium sized business
jets to its product line.
RTN's 1995 annual report recorded total revenue of
$11.7 billion; 34.2 percent to defense sales. The merged
company was the seventh largest U.S. defense firm ranked by
defense revenue.
Table 7 provides the variables used for the Raytheon,




Table 7 Raytheon, E-Systems Merger Results
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4 . Lockheed Martin Acquires Loral
Lockheed Martin (LMT) announced plans to acquire most
of Loral Corp. (LOR) on 7 Jan 1996. LMT paid $7.6 billion
for LOR's defense electronics and system integration
businesses using the purchase method of accounting. Loral
stockholders received $38 in cash per share plus shares on a
1:1 basis in a newly formed public company called Loral
Space and Communications. LMT took a 2 percent equity
position in the new company, which owned substantially all
of Loral's former space and satellite communication
business, and assumed $2.1 billion of LOR's debt. The merger
was consummated on 29 April 1996 when Loral changed its name
to LMT Tactical Systems and became a wholly owned subsidiary
of LMT.
Loral designed and manufactured a variety of defense
electronics systems. Total revenue in 1995 was $6.1 billion,
with defense sales comprising 81.7 percent of that total.
Primary product areas included: command, control,
communications, and intelligence systems, reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, systems integration, training and
simulation, and tactical weapons. Loral made complete
missiles as well as guidance and fire control systems for
missiles. LOR made two notable acquisitions prior to merging
with LMT. In March 1994, it acquired IBM's Federal Systems
division for $1.57 billion in cash. The following year, LOR
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acquired Unisys Corp . ' s Defense Systems business, a leading
systems integrator, for $862 million in cash.
By early 1996, LMT had restructured to absorb Martin
Marietta. LMT acquired LOR, its first since Martin Marietta,
to enhance its electronics, tactical systems, and
information technology services. With LOR s and Martin
Marietta's new business lines, LMT transformed itself from
being primarily a supplier of aircraft and aircraft related
systems to having more reliance on defense electronics.
LMT ' s 1996 annual report recorded total revenue of
$26.8 billion with 53.4 percent in defense sales. LMT
maintained its position as the number one defense contractor
measured in value of total defense revenue. LMT ' s chairman,
Daniel Tellep, said of the merger with Loral, "It enhances
our technological base, improves our competitiveness,
expands our global reach and provides new opportunities for
growth" (Reuters, 1996)
.
Table 8 provides the variables used for the Lockheed
Martin, Loral merger with the resulting AROE expressed in
percentage terms.
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5. Boeing Merges with McDonnell Douglas
On Sunday, 15 December 1996, Boeing (BA) announced its
plan to merge with McDonnell Douglas (MD) in a stock deal
worth $13.3 billion, the largest merger ever in the
aerospace industry. MD stockholders received 1.3 shares of
Boeing stock (split adjusted 2 for 1, June 97) for each MD
share held. Boeing issued 279 million new shares of common
stock to consummate the merger on 1 August 1997. (Note:
Boeing also issued stock worth $3,025 billion to acquire
Rockwell's Aerospace and Defense business in December 1996.)
McDonnell Douglas had a historically strong presence in
military and commercial aircraft design and manufacture.
Total revenue in 1996 was $13.8 billion; 73.2 percent to
defense sales. MD ' s major defense aircraft programs
included: AV-8B Harrier II, C-17 Globemaster, F-15, F-18,
AH-64 Apache, and the T-45 training system. Their space and
missiles sector provided Harpoon, Delta and Tomahawk
missiles. MD's market share of commercial aircraft fell to
only 4 percent in 1996 with orders for the MD-11, MD-80 and
MD-90 dwindling. Before the merger was announced, DOD
eliminated MD from the competition to build the Joint Strike
Fighter. LMT and Boeing were the surviving contestants.
(Bryant, 1996)
Boeing is predominately a commercial aircraft builder,
but maintains significant defense programs. Total revenue in
1996 was $22.7 billion while defense sales accounted for
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only 25.1 percent. Boeing's commercial airliners include the
737, 747, 757, 767, and 777. BA ' s major defense programs
include: CH-47 helicopters, V-22, E-3 AWACS, F-22 (wings,
fuselage, radar, avionics integration, and 70% of mission
software), and systems for the B-2.
This merger made sense for Boeing for two reasons.
First, they eliminated a competitor in commercial airliners
while gaining excess capacity at the Douglas division's
plants to build airliners that Boeing needed to keep up with
airliner demand. Second, MD ' s existing programs and
experience in military aircraft positioned Boeing as the
only viable competitor to LMT.
BA's revenue for the nine months ending 3 September
1997 was $34.1 billion. Although rankings for 1997 are not
tabulated, BA should rank second to LMT with between $12 -
15 billion in defense sales.
Table 9 provides the variables used for the Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas merger with the resulting AROE expressed
in percentage terms. Post -merger data was based on pro forma
third quarter financial statements.
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6 . Raytheon Pending Merger with Hughes Defense
Raytheon (RTN) announced plans to acquire Hughes
Electronics defense business on 15 January 1997. Hughes
Electronics consists of defense, Delco Electronics and space
operations. In a complicated transaction, RTN will pay about
$9.5 billion in stock and cash to General Motors (GM) and
Hughes (GM class H) stockholders for the defense part of the
company. GM owns all of Hughes Electronics, but Hughes
trades separately under the symbol GMH . RTN stockholders
will receive Class B shares in the new Raytheon which will
represent 7 percent of the company. GM common and GMH
stockholders will receive Class A shares totaling 30 percent
of the new Raytheon. This will be a tax free transaction for
both firms and the stockholders. GM will transfer Hughes'
Delco Electronics to its automotive systems business and
will retain control of the telecommunications and space
operations. The deal is expected to close in the third
quarter of 1997.
Hughes Defense business contributed 4 percent to both
GMH s sales and profits in 1996. The defense business alone
had total 1996 revenue of $6.3 billion. GMH ' s defense
product areas include: electro-optics (forward looking
infrared radar, night vision equipment, laser range
finders), missile systems, and ground based radar systems.
Newer information system and service programs include:
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Desktop V, Wide Area Augmentation System, and Hughes Air
Warfare Center.
In 1997, RTN still operated in the same four businesses
described from 1994. RTN ' s 1996 revenue totaled $12.3
billion with 32.8 percent attributed to defense sales. The
company absorbed E-Systems defense electronics products from
the 1995 merger and completed a $2.95 billion purchase of
Texas Instruments defense business on 11 July 1997.
RTN has positioned itself as the third biggest defense
contractor behind Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The firm will
have total revenue of nearly $21 billion after the Hughes
deal is closed with defense revenue of $13 billion. The
defense electronics share of its business will increase to
60 percent of revenues from only 40 percent in 1994. (Lipin &
Stern, 1997)
The Department of Justice (DOJ) approved RTN's proposed
merger with Hughes on 2 October 1997, but with two
stipulations. First, the DOJ prompted RTN to sell an
infrared sensor and ground electro-optical systems business
prior to the merger over concerns that the new firm would
have near monopoly control in certain air-to-air missiles,
night vision, sensors for satellites, and radar technologies
(Mintz, 1997) . The DOJ also set up a "firewall" so that RTN
and GMH teams can still bid for an anti-tank missile system
while keeping the technology separate within the company.
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Table 10 provides the variables used for the Raytheon,
Hughes merger (to date) with the resulting AROE expressed in
percentage terms . Financial data for the Texas Instrument
defense acquisition is not included in the these results.
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7. Lockheed Martin's Pending Merger with Northrop
Grumman
Lockheed Martin (LMT) announced plans to merge with
Northrop Grumman (NOC) after the market close on 3 July
1997. NOC stockholders will receive 1.1923 shares of LMT
common stock for each share of NOC stock. The transaction is
pending shareholder approval and DOJ review. LMT will use
the pooling of interest method of accounting and expects to
complete the deal in early 1998.
By mid 1997, NOC operated in four main segments
including military and commercial aircraft, electronics and
system integration, data systems, and missiles.
Approximately 82.7 percent of NOC ' s $8.1 billion 1996
revenue was from defense sales. Major programs include: E-8
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) , E-2C
Hawkeye, and the BAT "brilliant" anti-armor munitions. It is
a major subcontractor for the F-18 and provides aircraft
components and subassemblies for the C-17 and commercial
airliners. The B-2 program accounted for 19 percent of
1997' s first quarter revenue verses 50 percent in 1993. NOC
acquired Westinghouse Electric' s defense and electronics
systems business in March 1996 for $3.6 billion in cash. On
1 August 1997, NOC issued 8.6 million shares of common stock
to complete the acquisition of Logicon, a leader in battle
management and information technology.
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LMT was the largest and most diversified defense
contractor before adding NOC ' s product lines. Their revenue
for the nine months ending 30 September 1997 was $20.2
billion and backlog orders totaled $46.9 billion. LMT's 1997
defense contracts include: AEGIS air defense systems, THAAD
air defense system, Milstar satellites, F-16, F-22, C-130,
P-3, and development of Space Based Infrared System,
Airborne Laser, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in
competition with Boeing. The winner of the JSF program could
take home a revenue stream of $750 billion over the
production life of the aircraft (Bryant, 1996)
.
The combined company will have total revenue of about
$37 billion in 1997. Sales to the U.S. government should
continue to account for 60 to 70 percent of total revenue
(Liu, 1997) . This merger will position LMT to either be the
prime contractor for the JSF program or a major
subcontractor for its avionics package using Northrop 's
product lines.
Table 11 provides the variables used for the Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman merger (to date) with the resulting
AROE expressed in percentage terms. Average Book Values were




Table 11. Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman Merger Results
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This section analyzes the resulting abnormal returns
from the sample firms in all seven mergers. The analysis
uses quantitative results from the transformed EBO model to
assess the impact of these mergers based on the changes in
AROE. Observations and interpretations of the changes in
abnormal returns between the five measured stages in the
merger process are discussed and conclusions are drawn.
Individual firm AROE values are also used for direct
comparison and analysis. Finally, observations concerning
the EBO model's utility for differentiating abnormal
earnings from stock prices are explained.
General patterns are identified where evident.
Additionally, change in AROE is explained in terms of being
a function of several independent factors. These factors are
used to isolate patterns in the data for interpretation. Not
all factors are identified or discussed at each period. The
factors are listed below:
• Role of the participant (acquirer or acquiree)
• Form of merger transaction
-Exchange of stock
-Exchange of cash
• Size in terms of dollar value
- Of the merger
- Of the firms involved in the merger (Annual
Sales)
• Line of Business (LOB) (Aircraft vs. Defense
Electronics)
• Trend (tendency for AROE to change systematically
over time)
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Line of Business (LOB) and size comparisons for each firm
are based on information presented earlier in this chapter.
The resulting abnormal returns from each stage in the
merger process are summarized for all firms in Table 12.
The left side of the table lists the sample mergers in
chronological order numbered from one to seven. The analysis
refers to each merger by its number. The timeline below each
merger refers to the start of the premerger period through
the last day of the last stage analyzed. The bold boxes in
the columns contain the AROE ' s for each merger stage from
each firm's Abnormal Earnings Worksheet. The shaded columns,
beside each "boxed" AROE, contains the percentage change
between the adjacent stages. Reading from top to bottom
shows AROE for any given stage in chronological order for
the separate mergers. Reading from left to right shows
individual firm AROE as the merger process moves through
each stage.
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1. Premerger to Announcement
This period compares the premerger "clean" AROE the
firm was expected to earn before the merger to the AROE
calculated on the announcement date. This measure reflects
investors' "immediate" reactions to the merger and reflects
initial revisions to their expectations concerning future
returns. The first shaded column on Table 12 shows the
difference between these stages as "percent change 1".
a. General Patterns
There was a vague "reciprocal" relationship
concerning the magnitude of changes in AROE between the two
participants in all mergers. Mergers where one participant
exhibited a large positive change tended to include another
participant which exhibited a negative change. For example,
in merger (1), Grumman s AROE increased by 100.51%, the
largest positive change. Northrop ' s AROE decreased the by -
10.60%, the largest negative change. This divergence between
participants is the result of the market expecting a large
increase in earnings potential attributable to one firm and
not the other. The market's immediate reaction is to expect
the acquiring firm's future earnings to be negatively




All acquired firms' AROE increased, ranging from
100.51% for Grumman to 3.03% for Martin Marietta. In these
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cases, the acquirer believes that it can earn superior
returns with the acquiree's assets than the firm is
currently producing. Therefore, the acquiring firm values
the acquiree above its current market price (a premium)
.
Three of the seven acquiring firms' AROE decreased
(Mergers 1, 3, 6) . The acquiring firm's AROE
decreases/increases because investors lower/raise their
estimates of the firm's future earning power due to the
merger. Decreasing AROE is consistent with lack of
confirmation by investors that mergers will necessarily
increase earnings power of the acquiring firms.
c. Form
The three acquirers showing the decreases in AROE
used cash transactions (Mergers 1, 3, 6) . In a cash
transaction, the acquiring firm pays cash to buy outstanding
shares of the acquiree. This often requires that the
acquiring firm increase its long term debt or use existing
cash on hand or both. Investor response is to reduce their
assessments of the acquiring firm's abnormal return due to
their expectation of increased risk resulting from the
merger
.
The AROE of all three acquirers using stock
transactions increased or remained constant (Mergers 2, 5,
7) . In a stock transaction, the acquiring firm issues new
shares in exchange for shares of the acquiree. The firm
incurs no new long term debt, but must float a larger amount
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of shares on the market. Investor assessment is that
issuing stock is more beneficial to earnings than using debt
to acquire new assets. In merger (2), Lockheed's AROE
increased at the merger announcement by 38.07 percent. The
market interpreted that Lockheed's merger with Martin
Marietta would increase the firm's ability to earn abnormal
returns in the future
.
d. Size
The AROE ' s of the two smallest firms increased the
most; Grumman $3.2 billion sales, and E-Systems $2 billion
sales (Mergers 1, 3) . Smaller firms most likely command a
higher "premium" from the acquiring firm. Their small size
allows the acquiring firm to quickly employ their new
resources without much restructuring. These mergers were
also cash transactions.
e. Conclusions
A firm's AROE change at the announcement stage is
due to the merger. Acquired firms of smaller size tend to
have the greatest increase in AROE. The magnitude of the
change in other firms is unpredictable. The direction of
change in AROE is a function of the role of the participant
and the form of the merger transaction.
2 . Announcement to Consummation
This period compares the announcement date AROE to the
Interim period AROE. This measure illustrates any adjustment
of AROE by investors as a result of more detailed
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information or analysis concerning the merger's impact on
future abnormal returns. The second shaded column on Table
12 shows the difference between these stages as "percent
change 2".
a. General Patterns
Thirteen of 14 firms saw only minor changes in
AROE of between 6.18 percent to negative 7.96 percent. The
overall changes in AROE between these periods represents a
delayed effect of the merger announcement to the market, but
the delayed effect is small. Initial expectations for future
returns were fairly accurate since further analysis or
information did not significantly change the assessment.
Martin Marietta's AROE increased significantly
more than any firm between these stages (33.84%) (Merger 2)
.
Lockheed and Martin Marietta's interim period was seven
months long giving investors time to digest the information
concerning the merger. The initial assessment of Lockheed's
ability to earn abnormal returns with Martin Marietta was
too low at the announcement date
.
b. LOB
AROE ' s for defense electronics firms, Raytheon and
Hughes, were both adjusted downward during the digestive
period (Merger 6) . This represented the only occasion where
both participant's AROE declined concurrently. The market
was uncertain as to what action the Department of Justice
would take concerning Raytheon's and Hughes's dominance in
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guided missile technology. This uncertainty led to the
downward revision in AROE for both firms
.
c. Conclusions
Immediate reactions to the merger announcements
are not always correct. This digestive or delayed effect is
the market ' s way of moving toward a more accurate
expectation of future earnings. The digestive effect was
small compared to changes seen in other periods.
3 . Premerger to Consummation
This period skips the announcement date result which is
due to the merger and focuses on a longer term expectation
of investors. It compares the "clean" AROE result with the
last measured AROE for each firm prior to the merger
consummation. This measure represents investor's initial
assessment plus the adjustments for subsequent analysis of
the information which yields the "fully digested"
expectations concerning future returns. The third shaded
column on Table 12 shows the difference between these stages
as "percent change 3".
a . General Pa tterns
In merger (2), both Lockheed's and Martin
Marietta's AROE increased significantly. There was no
"reciprocal" effect. Expectations adjusted to reflect that
Lockheed could earn a better return on its own assets by
merging with Martin Marietta, and earn a better return than
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Martin Marietta currently was. This may be an example of
expectations of future synergistic effects for this merger.
b. Role
All acquired firms' AROE increased. The
interpretation here is consistent with that of the premerger
to announcement date analysis.
Three of the seven acquiring firms' AROE decreased
(Mergers 1, 4, 6) . This interpretation is the same as the
premerger to announcement date analysis except that Lockheed
Martin (Merger 4) replaces Raytheon (Merger 3)
.
c. Form
The three acquirers showing decreases in AROE used
cash transactions (Mergers 1, 4, 6) . The expectation for
future abnormal returns is revised, but still negative. New
information or analysis did not change direction from the
initial expectation for cash transactions in general.
The AROE for all three acquirers using stock
transactions increased (Mergers 1, 5, 7) . The interpretation





Mergers (5) and (6) show little change in AROE for
any of the four firms. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon,
and Hughes showed very little variation in AROE throughout
their merger processes. This indicates that expectations for
their future abnormal earnings due to the merger is not much
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greater than if the firms had not made plans to merge at
all.
e. Conclusions
The change in the firm's AROE at the interim stage
is due to the merger and fully digesting current information
concerning the merger. The resulting, "Fully Digested" AROE
is more meaningful than the AROE at the announcement date.
The adjustments to expectations of future returns,
while occurring for every firm, did not materially change
from the patterns encountered at the announcement date
.
Acquirees tend to exhibit increases in their AROE due to the
merger. Acquirers using stock transactions also tend to
exhibit increases in their AROE.
4. Interim Period to Post-Merger Period 1
This comparison captures the difference between the
acquiring firm's "fully digested" AROE and the AROE of the
newly merged firm. This measure reflects the investors
"immediate" reactions to the newly merged firm and initial
revisions to expectations concerning future returns as a
result of consummating the merger.
Only five of the seven mergers could be analyzed at
this stage, since two have yet to be consummated. The forth
shaded column on Table 12 shows the difference between these
stages as "percent change 4".
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a. General Patterns
The new firm's AROE increased in four of five
mergers (Mergers 2, 3, 4, 5) . The new firm's AROE is a
consolidated expectation of future returns from both the
acquiree and acquirer. The increases in AROE reflect the
expectation of additional future abnormal earnings the now
merged acquiree will contribute to the new firm.
Northrop Grumman ' s AROE was 2 8.47 percent lower
than Northrop' s "fully digested" AROE (Merger 1) . Northrop
financed its cash purchase of Grumman almost entirely from
new debt. While Northrop may have anticipated the ability to
earn higher abnormal returns by acquiring Grumman, market
expectations immediately after the merger reflected lower
future rates of return.
b. Form
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin posted increased AROE
using a cash transaction (Mergers 3, 4), while Lockheed
Martin and Boeing posted increased AROE using a stock
transaction (Mergers 2, 5) . By this time in the merger
process, the effects of the form of the merger was already





This stage shows that four out of five firms
increased their abnormal rate of return through merger
activity. However, this result is the market's immediate
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expectation of the new firm's future abnormal earnings
generating capability based on limited information
concerning the actual effects of the merger consummation.
5. Post-Merger Period 1 to Post-Merger Period 2
This period's change addresses only the post -merger
firm. It assesses the change in AROE from Post-merger Period
1 to Period 2 . This measure reflects investors reassessment
of AROE given more information or analysis of the merger's
actual effect on the new firm. It isolates the ability of
the new firm to absorb the assets, personnel and operations
of the acquiree, the "digestive effects", between the two
periods. The fifth shaded column on Table 12 shows the
difference between these stages as "percent change 5".
a. General patterns
Each merged firm's AROE increased between these
stages (Mergers 1-4) . The time lag between these stages
allows the new firm to restructure and bring the acquired
firm into the folds of the new organization. The resulting
AROE data shows that each firm strengthened its abnormal
earnings power during the period. The increase in AROE could
be due to other factors including increased efficiencies or
synergy created by the merger.
b. Form
There was no difference between stock or cash
transactions (Mergers 1-4). The effects of the stock or
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The earliest mergers, Northrop Grumman and
Lockheed Martin, had the largest increases in AROE (Mergers
1, 2) . The market's expectations of future abnormal returns
was adjusted higher due to new information concerning the
new firms' growth prospects. The reassessment also may have
been based on restructuring efforts, efficiency gains, or
synergy.
The rate of increase in AROE is decreasing over
time (Mergers 1-4) . The first mergers in the sample created
some positive benefits for the firms as expectations for
future earnings were high for the newly merged firm, as
reflected in increases in AROE. As time passed, expectations
were less enthusiastic for later mergers. Raytheon's AROE
increased only 3.18% after acquiring E-Systems in 1995
(Merger 3) . Lockheed Martin also saw a minuscule increase of
.92% in AROE after its merger with Loral in 1996 (Merger 4)
.
d. Conclusions
Merger activity has had a positive impact on firms
ability to earn abnormal returns in the short run. The
enthusiasm for defense mergers, while still positive, is
weakening over time. Investor expectation of future earnings
for defense firms may have already peaked or reached a
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plateau by 1997, indicated by a slower rate of growth in
abnormal returns in most recent mergers.
6 . Direct Comparison of AROE Values
The analysis in the first part of the chapter dealt
only with isolated changes between stages in the merger
process. While each post-merger firm had a higher rate of
abnormal earnings after the merger process, several firms in
the sample were involved in multiple mergers that provide
additional observations of AROE.
a. General Observation
Boeing earns the highest abnormal rate of return
(4.216%) compared to other firms in the sample. Therefore,
Boeing could be considered the most effective in terms of
monopoly power. However, Boeing's percentage of military
sales are less significant than its peers. Boeing's higher
rate may be due to its dominant position in the commercial
airliner business.
Jb. Size
There is a relationship between the level of AROE
values for all firms and the relative size of firms
generating that AROE. The level of AROE values for all firms
ranged from 1.37% - 3.9% in 1994-1995 (Mergers 1,2,3) to
2.078% - 6.527% in 1996-1997 (Mergers 4,5,6,7).
As of 30 Sept. 1997, the cutoff date for this analysis, five
of the original twelve firms remained, with two mergers
still uncompleted. The eight firms analyzed between 1994 to
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1995 (Mergers 1,2,3, including post-merger firm) had sales
between $2.0 billion and $22.8 billion. Firms in mergers (4,
5, 6, 7) Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, and McDonnell
Douglas had sales between $12.3 billion and $26.8 billion in
1996. The level of AROE percentage was generally higher for
the remaining group of five firms with higher total revenues
than when more firms were competing as in 1994
.
c. LOB
The cumulative effect over several years of merger
activity suggests that the change in measured 7AR0E is
significant for both Northrop Grumman (NOC) and Lockheed
Martin (LMT) . The primary line of business for both firms is
aircraft manufacturing. NOC s AROE increased by 64 percent
from Dec. 1994 (1.610%), to its premerger AROE in Apr. 1997
(2.646%) (Mergers 1, 7). During this period, NOC was
involved in other mergers with Westinghouse Electric '
s
defense and electronics systems and Logicon Corp. Lockheed
Corp . ' s (later Lockheed Martin) AROE increased by 148
percent from the premerger 1994 level (1.308%) to Sept. 1997
(3.249%) (Mergers 2, 7). Lockheed Corp. merged with Martin
Marietta, Loral, and was proceeding with plans to merge with
NOC during this period. In contrast, Raytheon's AROE only
increased by 3.69 percent from Jan 1995 (2.004%) to 30 Sept.
1997 (2.078%) (Mergers 3, 6). Raytheon's primary line of
business is defense electronics.
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d. Conclusions
As defense firms became larger, resulting from
merger activity, levels of abnormal returns increased.
Aircraft manufacturers, LMT, BA, and NOC were rewarded with
higher expectations of abnormal earnings than the defense
electronics firm Raytheon.
D. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE EBO METHODOLOGY
Change in AROE is not equivalent to the change in
price. Price valuations are tied to book value, cost of
capital, growth, and expectations concerning AROE, as
related in the EBO model. If price and AROE were equivalent,
this research would only need to analyze the change in price
during the merger process. Since prices instead reflect a
number of factors, removing the effects of these factors is
required to provide a specific measure of AROE. From this
measure, direct conclusions about expected future returns
can be drawn.
Several examples of price and the measure of AROE
moving in opposite directions exist in the data, reinforcing
the idea that price and AROE are not equivalent measures.
For example, in merger (7), Lockheed Martin's (LMT)
resulting AROE did not change between these stages for their
1997 merger announcement with Northrop Grumman, yet LMT '
s
price did increase. The reason was that Lockheed Martin's
book value had increased as well. If change in AROE was
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equivalent to change in price that would imply that
assessments of AROE had changed, which was not the case.
In merger (2), Martin Marietta's higher AROE during the
interim period did not change as stock price changed. In
fact, ML ' s average stock price was lower during the interim
period than on the announcement date (see Table 6) . The
decrease in stock price can be attributed to a higher cost
of capital as interest rates rose by 1 . 5 percentage points
during the seven months between stages of this merger. Thus,
direct observation of the change in stock price does not
indicate the expectations concerning AROE.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter presented the resulting AROE for each firm
along with descriptions of each merger process. The effects
of merger activity was analyzed in terms of changes in AROE
across all merger stages. Observations relating to the
usefulness of the transformed EBO model for the analysis
were also discussed.
Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions drawn from the
analysis, provides answers to the research questions and
recommends areas for further research.
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This research set out to examine whether merger
activity in the defense industry has created monopoly power
in individual defense firms. Monopoly power was defined as a
firm's ability to generate abnormal earnings. The EBO model
provided a means to measure expected abnormal earnings of a
firm using accounting and non-accounting data. The results
of the pre and post -merger analysis are summarized below:
• All post-merger firms analyzed recorded higher
Abnormal Rates of Return on Equity (AROE) than before
the merger.
• As firms increased in size, and fewer competitors
existed due to merger activity, the level of AROE
increased.
• The most recent post-merger results showed smaller
increases in AROE from their premerger levels.
• The magnitude of the change in AROE due to the
merger was unpredictable.
• The announcement of a merger caused the market to
reassess the expected future returns for the two
participants in some systematic ways.
- All acquirees experienced increases in expected
AROE.
- The acquirer's AROE generally increased when
using a stock transaction.
- The acquirer's AROE generally decreased when
using a cash transaction.
B. CRITIQUE OF EBO METHODOLOGY
The original EBO model was designed to estimate a
firm's intrinsic value (theoretical price) as a function of
future earnings, current book value growth and cost of
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capital . The transformed version used in the research
provided a forecast for future expected abnormal earnings
.
The resulting AROE measures demonstrate that changes in
stock price alone are not equivalent to the changes in AROE,
but are dependent on other factors including: a firm's book
value, cost of capital and growth rate. In that regard, the
model provided a measure not solely based on change in stock
price to analyze the effects of mergers.
The transformed EBO model used actual stock prices as
firm value and provided the market ' s expectation of abnormal
earnings. The fundamental assumption germane to the analysis
is that the stock market is efficient. This means that due
to the collective action of investors seeking to use
available information to their advantage, all information is
rapidly reflected in current stock prices and hence, current
prices are an unbiased measure of value. Since value is
based on the ability of a firm to generate future earnings,
the current market price can be used to reliably suggest
what the future may be, including expectations for abnormal
earnings. The abnormal rate of return is a measure of what
an efficient market interprets the firm's abnormal earnings
will be in the future.
Efficient markets are not omnicient; they do not
predict the future with certainty. Nevertheless, they do
render the most accurate assessment of what the future is
expected to be, given available information. Actual outcomes
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may not meet expectations, but the market is efficient
enough to render a meaningful measure of abnormal earnings
for this analysis.
The model assumed that defense firms' abnormal earnings
would exist indefinitely. Since it is difficult for firms to
enter the industry and, through competition, force abnormal
earnings to zero, this is not an unreasonable assumption.
However, the transformed EBO model does require some
assumption concerning the period of abnormal earnings. The
assumption adopted does bias all AROE measures downward.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis showed that expected Abnormal Rates of
Return on Equity (AROE) in all post -merger firms increased
due to merger activity. If one accepts the notion that
abnormal returns are an indicator of monopoly power, then
these defense firms have increased their monopoly power
through the merger activities analyzed.
Monopoly power is a question of degree. There exists no
one level or threshold that a value of AROE must cross that
would signal monopoly power. Rather, changes in AROE
indicate a movement along a continuum of earnings power,
between pure competition and pure monopoly. Pure competition
and pure monopoly markets exist on opposite ends of the
continuum. A firm in a purely competitive market will earn
zero abnormal earnings while a pure monopoly firm will earn
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some positive, though undefined, level of abnormal earnings.
Thus, as a firm's AROE moves in a positive direction, its
earnings power and monopoly position are increasing.
According to merger theory, one of the reasons firms
merge is to achieve higher profitability. The research
demonstrated that defense firms have enhanced their ability
to generate abnormal earnings implied by higher levels of
post -merger AROE. However, abnormal earnings could be
generated for different reasons. Just because AROE is
increasing does not mean a firm is pricing goods above a
competitive price level. AROE could increase due to a firm
increasing price while their costs remain constant. Such an
ability to increase prices is consistent with monopoly
power, but the firm's AROE could also increase due to
charging the same price while lowering its costs. Efficiency
gains and synergistic effects are two results of merger
activity that tend to lower costs for a firm, but which are
not necessarily evidence of monopoly power.
The research concludes that while no defense firm today
is a true monopoly, the reduction of competition among
defense firms from 1994 to 1997 has been accompanied by the
ability of the largest firms to earn higher AROE. Merger
activity among the three largest defense firms, Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon, has created a firm structure
defined as an oligopoly.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Valuation of defense firms : This research transformed
the EBO model for alternative use. A future study may use
the EBO model in the traditional way to estimate firm value.
This may provide an interesting extension to this research
if applied to defense merger activity.
Industry concentration and abnormal earnings : Is there
a correlation between concentration ratio in an industry and
abnormal earnings of firms in that industry? Shepherd (1997)
proposed that there should be at least five comparable firms
in a market for effective competition. After Lockheed Martin
merges with Northrop Grumman and Raytheon merges with
Hughes, there will be three major suppliers, including
Boeing, that dwarf the next tier of defense firms. Together,
these three firms will generate defense sales that account
for between 50 and 60 percent of the total 1997 Defense
Procurement and Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation (RDT&E) budget.
The impact of defense industry consolidation on
research and development : Economists argue over whether a
competitive industry is more likely to generate new ideas
and foster innovation than an oligopoly or monopoly. In
light if DOD ' s strategy to rely on advance technology as a
means to remain a dominant military power, how has defense
industry consolidation affected internal research and
development efforts in firms?
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Sources of financial information : The Naval
Postgraduate School does not maintain adequate financial
reference publications for research of this type. The
researcher investigated many electronic sources to gather
financial information from the Internet and Lexus/Nexus. A
useful thesis for research may be, "A comprehensive guide to
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APPENDIX B. DATA TABLES
This appendix provides the raw data required to
calculate abnormal rates of return for the individual firms
pre and post -merger using the transformed EBO model. Data is
listed in the following order:
• Three month T-bill rates
• Composite risk premium and SIC code description
• Historical Growth rates
• Company data tables for mergers 1 - 7
.
Company data tables state accounting values for the
firm as of their annual or quarterly report date. Stock




Three Month Treasury Bill Yields Sept 97 - Jan 93
Treasury Yield History (Source: First Call Corp &U.S.
Treasury)
Date Ave Yield Date Ave Yield
9/29/97 4.967% 4/27/95 5.848%
8/29/97 5.210% 3/31/95 5.913%
7/31/97 5.220% 2/28/95 5.953%
6/30/97 5.250% 1/31/95 5.972%
5/30/97 4.940% 12/31/94 5.850%
4/30/97 5.230% 11/30/94 5.493%
3/31/97 5.310% 10/31/94 5.411%
2/28/97 5.210% 9/30/94 4.770%
1/31/97 5.130% 8/31/94 4.636%
12/31/96 5.190% 7/31/94 4.498%
11/29/96 5.110% 6/30/94 4.275%
10/31/96 5.130% 5/31/94 4.304%
9/30/96 5.030% 4/30/94 3.828%
8/30/96 5.280% 3/31/94 3.633%
7/31/96 5.300% 2/28/94 3.388%
6/28/96 5.150% 1/31/94 3.078%
5/31/96 5.170% 12/31/93 3.135%
4/30/96 5.120% 11/30/93 3.190%
3/29/96 5.110% 10/31/93 3.098%
2/29/96 5.010% 9/30/93 3.000%
1/31/96 5.040% 8/30/93 3.110%
12/31/95 5.318% 7/31/93 3.118%
11/30/95 5.525% 6/30/93 3.158%
10/31/95 5.456% 5/31/93 3.180%
9/30/95 5.410% 4/30/93 2.938%
8/31/95 5.568% 3/31/93 3.320%
7/31/95 5.630% 2/28/93 3.130%
6/30/95 5.633% 1/31/93 3.125%
5/30/95 5.686%
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SIC Codes and Cost of Capital Risk Premium





























































































































































































































































































































STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CODE (SIC) NUMBERS AND DESCRIPTION
1499 Miscellaneous Non Metallic Minerals
36 Electrical Equipment
3631/32 Major Appliances
3663 Radio, TV, Communications Equipment
3694 Engine Electrical Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment
3713 Truck, Bus Bodies
3721 Aircraft
2724 Aircraft Engines, Engine Parts
3728 Aircraft Parts, Equipment
3761/64 Space Vehicles, Missiles
38 Instruments and Related Products
3812 Search, Navigation Equipment
4899 Communication Services
50 Wholesale Trade
5065 Electrical Parts, Equipment
73 Miscellaneous Business Services
7370 Computer Related Services
7 371 Custom Computer Programming Services
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design
7359 Equipment Rental, Leasing
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Annual: Earnings, Dividends, Payout Ratios, Retention Rates
Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC) Growth Rate 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Earnings per share $ 3 99 $ 511 $ 5 00
Dividend per share S 160 S 1 60 $ 1 60
Payout Ratio 401 0313 320
Retention Rate 0.655 0.599 0.687 0.680
Northrop Corp. (NOC)
Earnings per share $ 1.99 $ 256 S 4.26 $ 448
Dividend per share S 1 60 $ 1.20 $ 1 20 $ 1 20
Payout Ratio 804 469 282 0268
Retention Rate 0.544 0.19$ 15J1 H.71J 0.732
Grumman Corp. (GQ)
Earnings per share $ 1 90 $ (3 49) $ 2.84 $ 246
Dividend per share $ 1.15 $ 1 00 $ 1 00 $ 1 00
Payout Ratio 605 (0.287) 352 I 0.407
Retention Rate 0.545 0,395 1.287 0,648 0.593
Lockheed Martin (LMT) Growth Rate 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Earnings per share S 6 04 $ 3.05
Dividend per share $ 160 $ 1.34
Payout Ratio 0265 439
Retention Rate 0.648 0.735
Lockheed (LK)
Earnings per share $ 700 $ 6.70 $ 565 $ 486 $ 5 30
Dividend per share $ 2.24 $ 212 $ 2 09 $ 1.95 $ 1 80
Payout Ratio 320 0316 0370 0401 340
Retention Rate 0.651
Martin Marietta (ML)
Earnings per share $ 5.05 $ 3 80 $ 3.61 $ 3.15 $ 3 26
Dividend per share $ 093 $ 87 $ 80 $ 075 $ 069
Payout Ratio 0184 0229 220 238 0213
Retention Rate 0.783 0.81$ 0.780 0.762 0.787
Loral (old) (LOR)
Earnings per share $ 210 $ 338 $ 2.72 $ 207 $ 200 $ 1.78 $ 1 71
Dividend per share $ 0.24 $ 59 $ 0.55 $ 050 $ 47 $ 043 $ 042
Payout Ratio 112 175 200 239 0235 0.242 | 0.246
Retention Rate 0.793 0.888 0.825 ©300 0.761 0,765 0:75B ©J54
Raytheon (RTN) Growth Rate 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Earnings per share (not adjusted for 95 split) $ 3.30 $ 325 J 451 $ 5.11 $ 4.72 $ 4 48 $ 427
Dividend per share $ 0.79 $ 0.75 $ 1 46 $ 1.40 $ 1 33 $ 1 20 $ 1.18
Payout Ratio 239 231 324 274 0.282 268 0276
Retention Rate 0.729 0.761 0.76! 0.87< 0.711
E-Systems (ESY) $ 2.79 $ 3.58 $ 3.31 $ 3.35 $ 274
Earnings per share $ 1 20 $ 1.10 $ 94 $ 0.75 $ 069
Dividend per share 0430 307 284 224 252
Payout Ratio 0.701 O.S70 0.633 4.716 0.778 0,748
Retention Rate
Hughes Electronics (GMH)
Earnings per share $ 288 $ 277 $ 2.70 $ 2.30 $ (0.11) $ 1.26 $ 1 82
Dividend per share $ 96 $ 92 $ 0.80 $ 072 $ 72 $ 072 $ 0.72
Payout Ratio 0333 0332 0.296 0313 (6 545) 0571 396
Retention Rate 0.537 0,857 0.668 0,704 0.687 7,545 0429 O.604
Boeing (BA) Growth Rate 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Earnings per share (Split adiusted) $ 1.60 $ 058 $ 1 26 $ 1 83 $ 1 62 $ 2 28 $ 2 01
Dividend per share $ 0.55 $ 050 $ 050 $ 050 $ 050 $ 050 $ 0.48
Payout Ratio 344 0862 0.397 0273 0309
I
0219 0.236
Retention Rate 0.623 0.656
McDonnell Douglas (MD)
Earnings per share (Split adjusted) $ 3.64 $ (1.83) $ 2.53 $ 169 $ (3.35) $ 1 84 $ (0 44)
Dividend per share $ 046 $ 40 $ 023 $ 023 $ 23 $ 029 $ 047
Payout Ratio 126 (0 219) 091 136 (0 069) 158 (1.068)
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